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ST. JOHN'$YLAW REVIEW
At this point there is a right to a jury trial on the question whether the
parties had agreed upon Simplified Procedure.'30
In Time Writers, Inc. v. Coleman,131 the plaintiff moved for a de-
fault judgment in an action allegedly commenced under CPLR 3031.
The court denied the motion, because plaintiff's action had been com-
menced unilaterally. Plaintiff contended that his action was authorized
by 3033 and 3034, on the ground that the parties had contracted to use
the Simplified Procedure set down in section 3031. The court indicated
that rule 3034, in conjunction with sections 3031 and 3033, requires the
plaintiff to move for settlement of the terms of the statement prior to
moving for a judgment.132 Plaintiff was advised to personally serve the
potential defendant, in order to empower the court to determine
whether the parties had in fact agreed to submit.133
ARTICLE 32 - ACCELERATED JUDGMENT
Collateral Estoppel: Stranger to prior suit properly held not bound by
previous determination of the issues.
Res judicata precludes relitigation of the same Cause of action be-
tween the same parties or their privies when the cause of action has pre-
viously been adjudicated on the merits. 134 Collateral estoppel precludes
relitigation of the identical issue actually litigated and necessarily de-
termined in a prior action based on a different cause of action in which
a party or one in privity with him participated. 135
Molino v. County of Putnam36 was an action for the wrongful
death and conscious pain and suffering of the plaintiff-administratrix's
daughter, who died from injuries sustained in a one-car accident. The
plaintiff sought recovery against Putnam County and against an indi-
vidual defendant, a passenger in the automobile, who had previously
recovered against the car owner, the decedent's father, in an action in a
federal district court. The Court of Appeals held that the principle of
130 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3033, commentary at 238 (1970). Section 3033(2) confers the
right of jury trial; rule 3034(3) provides the procedure through which it may be demanded.
181 67 Misc. 2d 258, 523 N.YS.2d 862 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1971).
132 "It would seem that total compliance with § 5034 would be a prerequisite tO a
motion for judgment." Id. at 259, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 864. See 3 WK&M 3034.01.
133 67 Misc. 2d at 259, 323 N.Y.S2d at 864.
134 See, e.g., Smith v. Kirkpatrick, 305 N.Y. 66, 111 N.E.2d 209 (1953).
135 See, e.g., 5 WK&M 5011.24 et seq.; Rosenberg, Collateral Estoppel in New York,
44 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 165 (1969). The New York test for applying the doctrine of collateral
estoppel involves two elements: (1) an identity of issue necessarily decided previously, and
(2) a full and fair opportunity to contest the previous decision. Schwartz v. Public Adm'r,
24 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 246 N.E.2d 725, 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 960 (1969). See also The Quarterly
Survey, 44 Sr. JoHN's L. RIy. 135, 144-51 (1969).
186 29 N.Y.2d 44, 272 N.E.2d 323, 323 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1971).
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collateral estoppel would not be applied against the plaintiff since she
was not a party to the prior suit'37 and did not have a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issues presented in that suit. The Court
remarked that this was the first time that a defendant had sought "to
apply the principle of collateral estoppel to a plaintiff who was not a
party to the prior litigation.' '138
Being a stranger to the previous suit, the plaintiff could not and
should not have been bound to the prior determination, since she would
thereby be deprived of her day in court. The Court of Appeals answered
the objection that the decedent's father might share in any recovery by
the plaintiff by pointing out that the statute139 which imputes to an
owner-non-operator the negligence of his driver in order to impose
liability to an injured third party does not impute the driver's negli-
gence to the owner when he attempts to recover his own damage.140
ATrpicLE 41- TRAIL BY A JURY
CPLR 4102: Conduct of parties held to constitute a waiver of the right
to a jury trial.
CPLR 4102 provides that a party may waive his right to a jury
trial by failing to make a demand in the note of issue or after service of
the note of issue, by failing to appear at trial, by filing a written waiver
with the clerk, or by oral waiver in court.'4 '
In Clark v. Garth,142 the Monroe County Court was presented with
an appeal from an Order of Reference granted by the City Court of
Rochester on February 23, 1970. The defendant appealed on the ground
that referral would deprive him of his right to a jury trial. The action,
commenced on September 4, 1968, involved a claim for $500, the bal-
ance due on a sale. The parties amassed a mountainous record as a
result of an escalation of statements, notices, affidavits, memoranda,
motions, and cross-motions. In addition to finding that the defendant
waived his right to a jury trial by joining an equitable counterclaim
137 See, e.g., Neenan v. Woodside Astoria Transp. Co., 261 N.Y. 159, 184 N.E. 744 (1933).
138 29 N.Y.2d at 48, 272 NXE.2d at 325, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 819-20.
139 N.Y. Vms. & TRAP. LAW § 388 (McKinney 1970).
140 29 N.Y.2d at 49, 272 N.E.2d at 325-26, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 821, citing Continental Auto
Lease Corp. v. Campbell, 19 N.Y.2d 350, 227 N.E.2d 28, 280 N.Y.S.2d 123 (1967), discussed in
The Quarterly Survey, 42 ST. JonN's L REv. 438, 460 (1968); Mills v. Gabriel, 284 N.Y.2d
755, 31 N.E.2d 512 (1940), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 42 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 438,
459 (1968).
141 A party may also waive his right to a jury trial by joining a claim not triable by
jury based on the same transaction with a claim triable by jury. See, e.g., Noto v. Headley,
21 App. Div. 2d 686, 250 N.Y.S.2d 503 (2d Dep't 1964). A waiver does not deprive the other
party of his right to a jury trial without his consent. CPIR. 4102 (c).
142 67 Misc. 2d 473, 323 N.Y.S.2d 890 (Monroe County Ct. 1971).
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